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Abstract We examine whether the relative equity market valuation conditions (EMVCs)
in the countries of merging firms help acquirers’ managers to time the announcements of
both domestic and foreign targets. After controlling for several deal- and merging firm-
specific features we find that the number of acquisitions and acquirers’ gains are higher
during periods of high-EMVCs at home, irrespective of the domicile of the target. We also
find that the higher gains of foreign target acquisitions realized during periods of high-
EMVCs at home stem from acquiring targets based in the RoW (=World-G7), rather than
the G6 (=G7-UK) group of countries. We argue that this is due to the low correlation of
EMVCs between the UK (home) and the RoW group of countries. However, these gains
disappear or even reverse during the post-announcement period. Moreover, acquisitions of
targets domiciled in the RoW (G6) countries yield higher (lower) gains than acquisitions of
domestic targets during periods of high-EMVCs at home. This suggests that the relative
EMVCs between the merging firms’ countries allow acquirers’ managers to time the
market and acquire targets at a discount, particularly in countries in which acquirers’
stocks are likely to be more overvalued than the targets’ stocks.
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‘‘The concerns of boardrooms have generally shifted away from macro issues to
valuation when it comes to a deal’’ June 2015, Wilhelm Schulz, Head of Europe,
Middle East and Africa M&A at Citigroup.
1 Introduction
Record valuations in 2015 point to a new record of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As)
boom with the expectation of M&As continuing for at least another year due to favorable
economic conditions (Fontanella-Khan et al. 2015). Favorable market and economic
conditions lead to firms financing a large proportion of their financing deficit with net
external equity, particularly when the cost of equity is low (Huang and Ritter 2009). An
extant literature has emerged over the last few decades investigating the effect of M&As on
firm value (i.e. acquirer abnormal returns) by analysing several wider market conditions at
the time the investment is initiated, financed, and implemented. Some of the earlier studies
focus on the valuation effects of factors pertinent to deal and merger partners,1 while others
analyze the implications of equity market valuation conditions (EMVCs).2
To this date, there are still considerable gaps in our understanding of the determinants of
merger value creation, and in particular of the impact of EMVCs on the wealth of
shareholders of firms engaged in domestic M&As versus those engaged in cross-border
mergers and acquisitions (CBAs). While foreign target M&As occur for similar reasons as
domestic ones, national borders add a number of complexities to the estimation of syn-
ergies and premium to foreign target M&As, relative to that of domestic ones. For instance,
Doidge et al. (2007) show that firms do not differ significantly in corporate governance
levels only after controlling for country characteristics. Moreover, legal frameworks
determine corporate valuation (La Porta et al. 2002), market efficiency (Morck et al. 2000)
and the magnitude of currency crises (Johnson et al. 2000), among others. As CBAs are
associated with additional frictions relative to domestic acquisitions, such as, cultural and
geographical differences, political, economic, foreign exchange, taxation, accounting
standards, and potentially corporate governance differences (Bris and Cabolis 2008), such
frictions can impede or facilitate M&As. The theoretical framework of Shleifer and Vishny
(2003) argues that more overvalued acquirers tend to use their shares to acquire less
overvalued targets. We further argue that the imperfect integration of capital markets
across countries can also motivate foreign target M&As in which an overvalued acquirer
purchases a relatively inexpensive target following changes in exchange rates or stock
market valuations in the local currency. Therefore, we thoroughly investigate the extent to
which EMVCs within the merging firms’ countries: (a) play a key role in assisting the
acquirers’ managers to time the announcement of domestic and foreign target acquisitions
and, (b) affect acquirers’ value gains both in the short- and long-run.
Whether this consensus appeals in domestic versus foreign deals, especially when
EMVCs of the merging firms are not synchronized, remains an important question to be
investigated. We fill this void by empirically examining whether acquirers’ managers time
the announcement of both domestic and foreign target M&As, as captured by the EMVCs
1 These studies are mainly concerned with the sensitivity of acquirers’ gains to deal and firm-specific
characteristics, such as the relative size of the deal (Asquith et al. 1983), the method of payment (Travlos
1987), the listing status of targets (Draper and Paudyal 2006), the size of the acquirer (Moeller et al. 2004),
and the growth opportunities of the acquirer (Sudarsanam and Mahate 2003).
2 See for example, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004).
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at home relative to that in the host countries. We perform this by focusing exclusively on
UK acquirers as they are the most active worldwide in engaging in CBAs.3
Existing evidence shows that takeovers of domestic targets cluster over time and several
theories attempt to explain this phenomenon, such as the neoclassical theory of mergers,
the strategic theory and the behavioral approach, among others.4 First, the neoclassical
theory of merger waves, which is mainly associated with the work of Gort (1969), posits
that M&A activities spike with technological, economic and/or regulatory industry shocks.
Similarly, in an earlier work Nelson (1959) showed that M&A activities are highly
associated with business cycles. Second, the strategic theory of merger waves focuses on
the acquisition performance, motives, and strategies (Kusewitt 1985; Toxvaerd 2008). In
particular, Toxvaerd (2008) develops a theoretical model predicting that competitive
pressure interacts with the irreversibility of mergers in an uncertain environment, and
argues that acquirers either postpone a bid in order to gain from more favorable future
market conditions, or enter the bidding contest. He argues that while in a complete
information model all acquirers rush to bid creating merger waves, in an incomplete
information environment various factors representing economic fundamentals, including
the benefits from mergers and target scarcity, affect the timing of the merger waves. Third,
the behavioral explanation of Shleifer and Vishny (2003), argues that the observed clus-
tering in M&A activity is largely driven by stock market miss-valuations. Similarly, Rau
and Stouraitis (2011) argue that the waves of corporate activity are driven by a time-
varying influence of both the neoclassical and miss-valuation hypotheses.
Timing the announcement of M&As is an important factor influencing the likelihood of
M&A success, since, for example, M&As announced during periods of high investor
sentiment are likely to be associated with greater mispricing levels (Stambaugh et al.
2012). This mispricing stems from the stronger impact of market-wide sentiment on stocks
that are difficult to value (Baker and Wurgler 2006) and the positive (flat) relationship
between sentiment and expected returns during low (high) sentiment periods (Yu and Yuan
2011). The evidence on M&As in the US suggests that the announcement period (short-
run) gains and the post-announcement (long-run) performance of acquirers are also sen-
sitive to factors pertinent to stock market conditions at the time of the M&A announce-
ment. For example, Bouwman et al. (2009) show that M&As announced during periods of
high-EMVCs lead to higher acquirers abnormal returns in the short-run, but such gains are
eliminated in the long-run. Rosen (2006) also confirms the same pattern in the performance
of acquirers and argues that the observed superior announcement period gains of acquirers
at the time of high-EMVCs are driven by investors’ sentiment. However, the aforemen-
tioned studies analyse the impact of EMVCs for domestic target M&As and ignore the the
impact of relative EMVCs between the merging firms countries in CBAs on the gains of
domestic versus foreign acquirers, which remains to be investigated.
Due to the globalization of financial markets and the relaxation of restrictions in capital
mobility, CBAs have increased substantially. For example, the World Investment Report
(UNCTAD) (2009, p. 11, Table I.3.) shows that in 2007 the total value of global CBA deals
reached over $1,197bn compared to only $39bn in 1987, which represents a record increase
of more than 68 % over the value of 2006 ($711bn). In the same year, net purchases of UK
firms reached 21.5 % of the global market. Consequently, the literature has turned to
3 Healy and Palepu (1993) portray the UK as a leader in CBA deals accounting for roughly 30 % of global
activity in the late 1980 s. Similarly, data available from the United Nations (UNCTAD 2000) portray the
UK as holding the same proportion of CBA activity by the late 1990s.
4 See for example, Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), and Bouwman et al. (2009).
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investigate the effects of domestic versus CBAs on acquirers’ gains.5 Some of the earlier
studies show that the gains of merger partners in CBAs are affected by the strength of the
acquirers’ domestic currency (Kang 1993). Froot and Stein (1991) predict that when the
acquirers’ currency is strong against the US dollar they will have an advantage when
purchasing US targets. This is empirically confirmed by Harris and Ravenscraft (1991)
who study US target firms only and find that a stronger currency—against the US dollar—
of foreign acquirers leads to higher wealth effects for US targets at the time of the M&A
announcement. di Giovanni (2005) further shows that CBA activities are affected by
financial and other institutional factors, with the size of financial markets being one of the
most influential factors.
Overall, these findings suggest that M&A activities (domestic and cross-border) are
affected by financial and economic conditions in the acquirers’ home market. However,
little is known about the effect of relative EMVCs on the gains of acquirers targeting
domestic versus foreign target firms. We address this issue and identify whether managers
of acquiring firms can extract any benefits by timing the market, namely, whether the
relative EMVCs in merging firms’ countries allow them to time the announcement of both
domestic and foreign target M&As.
Our results show that acquirers enjoy higher short-run abnormal returns from deals
announced during periods of high-EMVCs at home, regardless of the target being a
domestic or a foreign firm, consistent with Bouwman et al. (2009). We further find that
foreign target acquirers enjoy greater gains from deals made during high-EMVCs at home
only when the EMVCs between the merging firms countries are less likely to be correlated,
which falls in the category of the target operating in the RoW (=World-G7) rather than in
the G6 (=G7-UK) group of countries. However, this is disappearing or even reversed in the
post-merger period. We argue that the EMVCs at home, relative to host countries, allow
managers to time the market and acquire targets at a discount, particularly in markets in
which their stocks are likely to be more overvalued than their targets. UK acquirers also
reap superior gains from M&As announced during relatively strong trade-weighted
effective exchange rate of the domestic currency. In the context of domestic versus foreign
target M&As we find that M&As of foreign targets from the RoW (G6) group of countries
yield higher (lower) acquirer gains compared to acquiring domestic targets when occurring
during periods of high-EMVCs at home. We argue that a possible explanation for this
finding is that the EMVCs in the RoW (G6) are lower (similar) to the ones at home, hence,
acquirers are more (less) likely to acquire targets at a discount. Overall, our results suggest
that acquirers aiming to maximize shareholder wealth can extract signals from EMVCs at
home relative to those in host countries, and carefully pick the timing of their M&As
announcements.
We contribute to the related literature by demonstrating the role of EMVCs at home
relative to EMVCs in the host countries, in the case of CBAs, on the the short- and long-
run gains of acquirers. Our findings suggest that firms willing to engage in acquisitions
should consider not only the merging firms- and deal-specific features, but also the possible
implications of factors pertinent to the wider economy such as EMVCs at home, relative to
EMVCs in the host country in the case of CBAs. Therefore, a simultaneous analysis of
EMVCs in the merging firms countries can assist managers in timing the announcement of
both domestic and foreign target M&As and maximize shareholder wealth.
5 See for example, Doukas and Travlos (1988), Lowinski et al. (2004), Gregory and McCorriston (2005),
Moeller and Schlingemann (2005), and Barbopoulos et al. (2012).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses.
Section 3 discusses the data and methodology employed. The empirical results are reported
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature and hypotheses
2.1 EMVCs and gains from M&A
A growing body of literature (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny 2003) suggests that during high-
EMVC periods, managers of firms with overvalued stocks are motivated to use their
overvalued stocks to bid for targets that they perceive to be less overvalued than them-
selves. In the long-run, however, when the market corrects for overvaluation, the acquirers
suffer a drop in share price indicating long-term under-performance. This theoretical
proposition has been supported by the empirical findings of, among others, Rhodes-Kropf
et al. (2005). Although the theoretical proposition of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) is limited
to all-share deals, a similar effect of high-EMVCs can occur on the performance of
acquirers in other types of deals, such as cash and mixed, due to managerial overconfidence
and investors’ optimism caused by booming markets. The manager of a company whose
market value is increasing is likely to be overconfident about one’s managerial ability and
start bidding for targets, driven by the maximization of their private benefits and prestige or
the enhancement of shareholder wealth (Draper and Paudyal 2006). When share prices
increase investors are likely to be more confident in their managers and react positively to
acquisition decisions. Consequently, acquirers are likely to experience higher announce-
ment period abnormal returns from bids announced at the time of high-EMVCs irre-
spective of the payment method. In contrast, at the time of low-EMVCs, investors are
likely to be skeptical about the value of the deals and react cautiously. This leads to the first
testable hypothesis (H1a): M&A announcements during high-EMVC-periods yield higher
short-run abnormal returns than deals announced during low-EMVC-periods. In the long-
run, however, there should be a market correction and M&As announced during during
high-EMVC-periods should exhibit a stock performance reversal that wipes out the
announcement gains or cause significant losses. This leads to our next hypothesis (H1b):
M&As announced during periods of high-EMVCs break-even or experience losses in the
long-run.
The short-run performance of bidding firms is a function of investors’ optimism
regarding the acquisition’s future prospect (Rosen 2006). The implications of investors’
sentiment, namely confidence, on M&A announcements are likely to differ by the domicile
of the target, given that foreign investments generally add to the level of uncertainty
regarding the expected value to be generated from the deal, mainly due to its additional
exchange rate, economic and political risks.
During periods of low-EMVCs, this added uncertainty exacerbates the already low
investor sentiment. Therefore, during low-EMVC periods, foreign acquisitions are
expected to deliver lower yields compared to domestic deals. However, during high-
EMVC periods acquirers of foreign targets are expected to yield a more favorable market
reaction than domestic deals, driven by higher investor optimism. These arguments lead to
the second testable hypothesis (H2): CBAs announced during high-EMVC periods at home
outperform domestic deals announced during similar periods.
Relative equity market valuation conditions and acquirers’…
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2.2 Relative equity market valuation conditions and the gains from CBA
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that during high-EMVC periods managers of firms with
overvalued shares are motivated to use shares for bidding to acquire targets they perceive
to be less overvalued than their own firm. This is particularly interesting in the CBA
context as different markets have different levels of EMVCs at any one time. Therefore, at
a given level of EMVCs at home, whether acquirers time the market and bid for targets
abroad is limited to their ability to identify less overvalued (foreign) targets than them-
selves. We argue that in CBAs the relative EMVCs (i.e. the deviation of EMVCs between
an acquirer’s and a target’s country) provide an additional insight to the acquiring firms’
managers aiming to maximize the wealth of their shareholders.
At a high level of EMVCs at the acquirer’s home market a lower correlation with the
EMVCs of the target firm’s country implies a low (or lower) EMVCs for the target firm.
Therefore, acquirers that are overvalued (or even fairly valued) and have higher EMVCs
compared to a foreign target’s country, they can exploit this EMVC deviation and yield a
more favorable market reaction to the M&A announcement. As discussed earlier, while
this effect is more pronounce to share deals, it can also apply to other types of deals, such
as cash and mixed (i.e. cash and shares), due to managerial overconfidence and investors’
optimism caused by the level of EMVCs at home. This leads to the third testable hy-
pothesis (H3): Acquirers gain significantly more from CBAs announced during periods of
high-EMVCs at home and low- or lower-EMVCs in the host country.
2.3 Strength of domestic currency and gains from M&A
A number of studies on foreign direct investment (for example, di Giovanni 2005) show
that the strength of the domestic currency plays a significant role in determining the flow of
foreign direct investment. On a theoretical framework Froot and Stein (1991) argue that
when the US dollar is weaker compared to foreign acquirers’ local currency they will have
a purchasing advantage for US targets. In line with this theoretical prediction, Harris and
Ravenscraft (1991) find that a weaker US dollar leads to a higher market reaction for US
firms being targeted by acquirers with a stronger currency due to their purchasing
advantage. When the domestic currency is stronger than its equilibrium value, it is cheaper
for acquirers to acquire foreign targets. This should not only enhance M&A activity but
also generate higher gains for acquirers. This is because when the domestic currency is
strong, the effective price (inclusive of premium) paid to foreign targets is more likely to
be less than the equilibrium value of the target. Consequently, such deals are more likely to
transfer wealth from target company’s shareholders to the shareholders of the acquiring
company. This leads to the fourth hypothesis (H4): M&As announced at times of stronger
domestic currency generate higher gains to acquirers.
3 Data and methodology
3.1 Data
The information on the deal announcements is extracted from Securities Data Corporation
(SDC). The sample comprises of 67,229 M&A bids announced by UK firms between
01/01/1986 and 31/12/2010. The sample of M&As analyzed by the paper includes 5880
D. Andriosopoulos, L. G. Barbopoulos
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(4142 domestic and 1738 foreign) deals that meet the following criteria: (1) The acquirer is
a UK company traded in the London Stock Exchange; (2) the target is a private, a public,
or a subsidiary firm, both domestic and foreign; (3) to avoid the effects of very small
transactions, only deals equal to, or greater than, £1 million are included; (4) the market
value of the acquirer is greater than £1 million at four weeks prior to the announcement of
the deal; (5) acquiring firms are not involved in multiple bids during the 5-day
announcement window of t - 2 to t ? 2 days around the announcement day, where t=0 is
the announcement day; (vi) the daily return to index, market value, and market-to-book-
value ratio of the acquirer are obtained from DataStream. Finally, we collect the monthly
P/E ratio for the FTSE All Share market index and the monthly P/E ratio for the 9 industry
groups from DataStream in order to measure the EMVC.
3.2 Sample statistics
Table 1 reports the annual distribution of M&As announced by UK acquirers between
01/01/1986 and 31/12/2010. The table shows that almost one in three M&A deals (30 %)
involve foreign targets. The proportion of CBAs in the UK increased steadily over time,
exceeding 40 % of all deals in 2010. In addition, the proportion of CBA in G6 (=G7-UK)
countries (20 %) is well over the proportion of CBA in the Rest of the World (RoW=-
World-G7) group of countries (10 %). We follow this classification due to the evidence
that the economic activity and stock market performance of the G7 countries (UK, US,
Canada, Germany, France, Italy, and Japan) are more integrated than the rest-of-the-world
(Jansen and Stokman 2004). The statistics also show that in approximately 51 % of the
deals the merging firms are based in the same-industry (based on the same 2-SIC code)
while the remaining 49 % are diversified deals. Approximately half of our sample
of M&As are settled in cash (44 %), while share only deals constitute 7 % of the total
number of deals in the sample. The proportion of cash only deals is much larger in CBA,
while only about one in twenty CBA deals are settled in shares. The largest deals in our
sample were announced during the dot com bubble (£479.3 m) followed by deals
announced before, and immediately after, the 2007 financial crisis. Moreover, the highest
takeover premia are offered during 1997 and 1998, whereas, acquirers enjoyed the higher
announcement period abnormal returns during the years 1993, 1999 and 2005.
Table 2 (Panel A) shows that unlisted targets account for about 91 % of all deals, while
only one in ten deals involve listed targets. The dominance of unlisted targets in UK
takeover deals is consistent with Draper and Paudyal (2006). The remaining statistics of
either transaction- or firm-specific characteristics reported in Panel A show that the number
of deals occurring during periods of high- versus low-EMVCs, is higher (1598 vs. 1545).
Noticeably, the sum of deal value in each group is substantially higher for deals occurring
during periods of booming than depressed markets across all classifications.
The total deal value of CBA deals is almost double than domestic deals (£331bn vs.
£177bn), while CBA deals are larger in the G6 countries compared to the RoW countries
(£276bn vs. £55bn). Table 2 (Panel B) also shows that the acquirers of foreign targets are
more mature (19.26 years) than their counterparts of domestic targets (14.65 years). Fur-
thermore, the average market capitalization of acquirers engaged in domestic M&As is less
than the average market capitalization of acquirers engaged in CBAs (£441.84 vs.
£1632.95 m). Acquirers of targets in the RoW countries (£1667.03 m) are larger than
acquirers in the G6 countries (£1616.18 m) albeit the deals being larger for the latter
(£236.95 m) than the former (£95.38 m) group. Furthermore, the average acquirer of a
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domestic target is less liquid than the corresponding acquirers of a foreign target (0.13 vs.
0.15), has higher leverage (22.88 vs. 20.03), and pays lower premia (37.29 vs. 42.24 %).
3.3 Classification of high-, neutral-, and low-EMVCs
The EMVC is measured by market P/E ratio, using the FT All share index as market proxy
and since the measure of EMVCs possesses an up-ward trend, it is de-trended using the
method outlined in Bouwman et al. (2009). First, the best straight line fit value of the
variable is removed from the observed value in each month and in five years preceding the
announcement. Second, each month is categorized as above (below) the average if the
detrended value of the variable for the month is above (below) the average of the previous
five years. Finally, the upper half of the above-average months (i.e., the 25 % top months)
are classified as high value periods and the lower half of the below-average months (i.e.,
the 25 % bottom months) are classified as low value periods. All other months in the
sample (i.e., 50 % of the middle months) are classified as neutral. As implied by the stock
market valuation argument of Shleifer and Vishny (2003), merger activity increases during
high-EMVC periods (Table 2, Panel A). Moreover, this pattern holds for both domestic
and CBAs, focused and diversified deals.
3.4 Methodology
The performance of acquirers is analyzed by indicators of EMVCs using both univariate
and multivariate frameworks. For the univariate analysis, first the excess returns of
acquirers announcing bids under various financial conditions are tested, followed by the
comparison of the gains of such acquirers. Finally, the gains of acquirers by the domicile of
their targets (domestic targets, foreign targets, acquirers of targets in G6 countries, and in
the RoW) and EMVCs at the time of the bid announcement are also compared. Under
multivariate analysis, similar tests on the gains of acquirers are performed after controlling
for the effects of other factors using cross-sectional regressions that are known to affect the
gains to acquirers.
Because of multiple bids by the same acquirers occurring within a short period, suffi-
ciently long time series of stock returns that are free from the effects of takeover bids are
not available to apply conventional time-series based excess-return estimation models.
Therefore, we follow Draper and Paudyal (2008) Fuller et al. (2002) and Faccio et al.
(2006) among others and use the market adjusted returns to estimate the announcement
period abnormal returns.,67 As a result, for measuring the announcement period abnormal
returns of acquirers the market-adjusted model is employed as shown in Eq. 1:
ARit ¼ Rit  Rmt ð1Þ
where, Rit is the return of firm i on day t, and Rmt is the market return measured by the
changes in FT-All Share Index (inclusive of dividends). The abnormal returns (ARit) are
6 A large number of bidder firms are typically engaged in multiple acquisitions and takeover bids which can
reduce significantly the number of sample firms having ‘‘sterile’’ risk parameters, potentially biasing our
findings. Never the less, for short event windows, the use of traditional and well established methods of
estimating abnormal returns does not improve significantly the accuracy of abnormal returns (Brown and
Warner 1980).
7 We employ alternative estimation methods for calculating the acquiring firm’s abnormal returns based on
the estimation of the model parameters of the 1-factor CAPM, the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model,
and the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model. Our results remain unaltered.
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cumulated for the 5-days (t - 2, t ? 2) surrounding the M&A bid announcements, as
shown in Eq. 2:
CARi ¼
Xtþ2
t2
ARit ð2Þ
3.5 Long-run performance of acquirers
To examine the post-merger performance of acquirers, the standard buy-and-hold-abnor-
mal return (BHARs) approach (Barber and Lyon 1997) is implemented. The monthly
abnormal return is calculated as the acquiring firm’s BHARs less the BHARs of the market
portfolio over the period T (1, 3, or 5 years following the acquisition announcement
month), as shown in Eq. (3):
BHARit ¼
Yt¼T
t¼1
1þ Ritð Þ 
Yt¼T
t¼1
1þ Rmtð Þ ð3Þ
where Rit is the monthly return for firm i; Rit is the monthly return of the market index;
t represents the 12, 36, 60 month after the acquisition’s month. The monthly BHAR of
each bidder is regressed against a set of explanatory variables, similar to the control factors
included in the analysis of announcement period returns, which are presented in the
Sect. 3.6.
3.6 Multivariate analysis
To further investigate the implications of relative EMVCs on announcement period gains
of the UK acquirers, we examine the impact of relative EMVCs after controlling for other
factors that are known to affect acquirers’ gains simultaneously. We do so by employing
Eq. (4) estimated in a nested regression form with various combinations of explanatory
variables discussed below.
alphai ¼ b1 þ
Xk
j¼2
bjXij þ ei i ¼ 1. . .N ð4Þ
When Eq. (4) is applied to analyzing the announcement period gains, the dependent
variable (alphai) is measured by the 5-days cumulative excess return of acquirers as
explained in Eq. (1). Alternatively, when Eq. (4) is applied to analyzing the post-merger
acquirer performance, the dependent variable (alphai) is measured by the 1-, 3- and 5-years
BHARs of acquirers as explained in Eq. (3). The intercept b1 in Eq. (4) reflects the excess
returns of acquirers after controlling for the effects of all explanatory variables, incorpo-
rated in the vector Xij, simultaneously, the impact of which is recorded in the vector bj. The
vector of explanatory variables Vi,j includes a set of explanatory variables discussed
below.
Earlier literature, based on the experience of listed targets, shows that cash-only
acquirers experience the highest gains, while share-only acquirers suffer a loss. However,
Travlos (1987) shows that the method of payment interacts with the listing status of targets
in shaping the gains of acquirers. Therefore, to control for the methods of payment, deals
are classified into cash only, shares only, and mixed. Moreover, on the announcement of
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M&A deals acquirers of unlisted targets gain more than acquirers of listed targets (Draper
and Paudyal 2006). Therefore, we control for the listing status of targets, namely listed,
private and subsidiary.
Larger acquirers gain less than smaller acquirers on the announcements of bids (Moeller
et al. 2004). Therefore, to allow for this effect we control for the size of the acquirer,
measured by their market capitalization (MV) four weeks before the announcement of the
deal. Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), among others, show that value acquirers (firms with
low market-to-book value ratio) outperform glamour acquirers (firms with high market-to-
book value ratio) in the short-run. Thus, we control for the growth opportunity of bidding
firms, measured by the market-to-book value (MTBV) ratio one month prior to the
announcement of the deal.
Draper and Paudyal (2008) suggest that acquirers’ announcement period gains are
dependent on the level of public information. Barry and Brown (1985) show that more
information is available in the public domain in relation to firms with a long trading
history. Since mature firms are likely to have a longer trading history, consequently more
publicly available information, we control for acquirer’s maturity (age) measured by the
number of days from the date a firm is first recorded on DataStream8 and the date of the
announcement. Several studies (Asquith et al. 1993) have shown that the acquirers’
announcement period returns increase with the size of the target relative to the value of the
acquirer. This may be due to the stronger impact on the structure of the organization of the
acquiring firm that relatively larger targets may have. It is also possible that the observed
positive relation between the relative size of the deal and gains from acquisitions is simply
a statistical effect as a relatively larger deal is likely to generate higher synergy gain, which
could be substantial relative to the size of acquirer. The relative size of the deal is measured
by the ratio of the acquirer’s market capitalization to the value of the deal.
We also control for the Effective Exchange Rate (Effect. Ex. Rate) of Pound Sterling
obtained from the Bank of England’s statistical database in order to account for the impact
of the strength of the domestic currency on acquirers’ gains.9 In addition, we add a set of
dummy variables that is assigned the value of 1 (0 otherwise) to control for: CBA deals,
diversifying deals (defined as a deal when target and acquirer do not share the same 2-digit
SIC code),10 private targets, cash-only deals, stock-only deals, high EMVC period, period
of strong domestic currency, and frequent acquirers. Finally, variables representing
interactions between various measures of EMVCs are also introduced in the model.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Acquirers’ announcement period gains
This section presents and discusses the findings from the univariate and multivariate
analysis of announcement period and long-run gains of acquirers against financial
8 This date corresponds to the first trading day of a listed firm. Since the disclosure requirements of listed
firms are much more stringent and systematic, the listing period is a good proxy measure of the level of
information in the public domain.
9 See www.bankofengland.co.uk. Moreover, the first difference of the effective exchange rate index (i.e.
changes is the value) of Pound Sterling does not have any trend and hence its de-trending is not required.
10 Anderson et al. (2011) report mixed evidence on the impact of corporate diversification on firm risk,
though, they suggest that on average diversification does not decrease firm risk.
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Table 3 Acquirers’ announcement period returns by EMVCs and target firm’s domicile
Equity market valuations conditions
ALL Low-
EMVCs
Neutral-
EMVCs
High-
EMVCs
HML-
EMVCs
Panel A: Market-adjusted model
ALL
Mean 1.36*** 1.04*** 1.18*** 1.99*** 0.95***
Median 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.46*** 0.66*** 0.15*
N 5880 1545 2737 1598
Domestic
Mean 1.38*** 1.08*** 1.21*** 2.01*** 0.93**
Median 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.48*** 0.60*** 0.10
N 4142 1136 1912 1094
CBA (ALL)
Mean 1.32*** 0.93*** 1.12*** 1.95*** 1.02*
Median 0.52*** 0.53** 0.42*** 0.79*** 0.26
N 1738 409 825 504
CBA (G6)
Mean 0.97*** 0.75** 0.89*** 1.28** 0.54
Median 0.39*** 0.37 0.38** 0.57* 0.20
N 1165 287 538 340
CBA (RoW)
Mean 2.02*** 1.36*** 1.55*** 3.33*** 1.98*
Median 0.84*** 1.14** 0.49*** 1.29*** 0.15
N 573 122 287 164
Differentials
Domestic versus CBA (ALL)
Mean 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.06
Median -0.01 -0.02 0.07 -0.19
Domestic versus CBA (G6)
Mean 0.42* 0.34 0.32 0.73
Median 0.13* 0.13 0.10 0.03
Domestic versus CBA (RoW)
Mean -0.63* -0.27 -0.34 -1.32
Median -0.33** -0.64 0.00 -0.69*
G6 versus RoW
Mean -1.05*** -0.61 -0.66 -2.05**
Median -0.45*** -0.77** -0.10*** -0.72**
Panel B: Carhart (1997) 4-factor model
ALL
Mean 1.56*** 1.09*** 1.36*** 2.34*** 1.25***
Median 0.62*** 0.49*** 0.67*** 0.62*** 0.13
N 5880 1545 2737 1598
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Table 3 continued
Equity market valuations conditions
ALL Low-
EMVCs
Neutral-
EMVCs
High-
EMVCs
HML-
EMVCs
Domestic
Mean 1.62*** 1.16*** 1.38*** 2.52*** 1.36***
Median 0.62*** 0.52*** 0.71*** 0.50*** -0.02
N 4142 1136 1912 1094
CBA (ALL)
Mean 1.40*** 0.89*** 1.33*** 1.94*** 1.04**
Median 0.62*** 0.44*** 0.62*** 0.78*** 0.34
N 1738 409 825 504
CBA (G6)
Mean 0.99*** 0.88** 1.02*** 1.05** 0.17
Median 0.50*** 0.46* 0.53*** 0.51* 0.05
N 1165 287 538 340
CBA (RoW)
Mean 2.25*** 0.94** 1.93*** 3.78*** 2.85***
Median 0.80*** 0.41*** 0.80*** 1.48*** 1.07**
N 573 122 287 164
Differentials
Domestic versus CBA (ALL)
Mean 0.22 0.27 0.05 0.59
Median 0.00 0.08 0.09 -0.28
Domestic versus CBA (G6)
Mean 0.63** 0.29 0.36 1.48**
Median 0.12* 0.06 0.18 -0.01
Domestic versus CBA (RoW)
Mean -0.62* 0.23 -0.55 -1.26
Median -0.18* 0.11 -0.09 -0.98**
G6 versus RoW
Mean -1.26*** -0.06 -0.91* -2.74***
Median -0.30*** 0.05 -0.27 -0.97***
Panel C: Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model
ALL
Mean 1.34*** 1.01*** 1.29*** 1.73*** 0.71**
Median 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.51*** 0.40*** -0.05
N 5880 1545 2737 1598
Domestic
Mean 1.39*** 1.10*** 1.31*** 1.82*** 0.72*
Median 0.48*** 0.46*** 0.57*** 0.30*** -0.15
N 4142 1136 1912 1094
CBA (ALL)
Mean 1.21*** 0.78*** 1.24*** 1.53*** 0.75
Median 0.41*** 0.32** 0.35*** 0.62*** 0.30
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Table 3 continued
Equity market valuations conditions
ALL Low-
EMVCs
Neutral-
EMVCs
High-
EMVCs
HML-
EMVCs
N 1738 409 825 504
CBA (G6)
Mean 0.85*** 0.78** 0.88*** 0.85* 0.07
Median 0.31*** 0.46* 0.26* 0.38 -0.07
N 1165 287 538 340
CBA (RoW)
Mean 1.96*** 0.77* 1.90*** 2.94*** 2.17**
Median 0.59*** 0.23** 0.47*** 0.77*** 0.54
N 573 122 287 164
Differentials
Domestic versus CBA (ALL)
Mean 0.17 0.32 0.08 0.29
Median 0.07 0.14 0.22 -0.32
Domestic versus CBA (G6)
Mean 0.54** 0.32 0.43 0.97*
Median 0.17 0.00 0.31 -0.08
Domestic versus CBA (RoW)
Mean -0.57 0.33 -0.59 -1.12
Median -0.11 0.23 0.10 -0.47**
G6 versus RoW
Mean -1.11*** 0.01 -1.02* -2.09**
Median -0.28* 0.23 -0.21 -0.38**
Panel D: 1 year (12 months) post-merger BHARs
ALL
Mean -1.99*** -3.74*** -5.10*** 5.04*** 8.78***
Median -6.31*** -6.63*** -7.80*** -3.46*** 3.17***
N 5876 1543 2735 1598
Domestic
Mean -2.90*** -4.08*** -6.99*** 5.47*** 9.56***
Median -7.23*** -8.17*** -9.41*** -2.91** 5.26***
N 4138 1134 1910 1094
CBA (ALL)
Mean 0.19 -2.80 -0.71 4.10 6.90*
Median -4.04*** -3.75** -4.02*** -4.28** -0.53
N 1738 409 825 504
CBA (G6)
Mean 0.60 -4.23** -2.49 9.58** 13.82***
Median -3.22*** -3.58* -4.17*** -1.18 2.40
N 1165 287 538 340
CBA (RoW)
Mean -0.64 0.58 2.62 -7.25** -7.83
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Table 3 continued
Equity market valuations conditions
ALL Low-
EMVCs
Neutral-
EMVCs
High-
EMVCs
HML-
EMVCs
Median -5.82*** -4.98* -3.94 -9.20*** -4.23
N 573 122 287 164
Differentials
Domestic versus CBA (ALL)
Mean -3.09** -1.29 -6.28*** 1.37
Median -3.19** -4.41 -5.39*** 1.37
Domestic versus CBA (G6)
Mean -3.50** 0.15 -4.50** -4.11
Median -4.01** -4.59 -5.24** -1.73
Domestic versus CBA (RoW)
Mean -2.26 -4.66 -9.61** 12.72***
Median -1.41 -3.19 -5.47** 6.29**
G6 versus RoW
Mean 1.24 -4.81 -5.11 16.84***
Median 2.60 1.40 -0.23 8.02**
Panel E: 5 years (60 months) post-merger BHARs
ALL
Mean -5.99*** -15.00*** -7.10*** 4.66 19.66***
Median -30.35*** -43.75*** -30.35*** -16.86*** 26.90***
N 5845 1539 2719 1587
Domestic
Mean -7.55*** -15.70*** -10.71*** 6.40 22.10***
Median -35.42*** -47.25*** -36.44*** -21.58*** 25.66***
N 4118 1130 1899 1089
CBA (ALL)
Mean -2.26 -13.06** 1.24 0.86 13.92*
Median -18.37*** -32.79*** -13.96*** -11.85*** 20.94***
N 1727 409 820 498
CBA (G6)
Mean -1.41 -15.60** 4.39 1.45 17.05*
Median -18.64*** -40.01*** -11.28*** -12.20*** 27.81***
N 1159 287 536 336
CBA (RoW)
Mean -3.98 -7.10 -4.70 -0.37 6.73
Median -17.55*** -21.32*** -19.33*** -10.47 10.85*
N 568 122 284 162
Differentials
Domestic versus CBA (ALL)
Mean -5.30 -2.64 -11.95** 5.54
Median -17.05*** -14.46** -22.48*** -9.73
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conditions (i.e. EMVCs) at the time of M&As announcements. The gains are also analyzed
by the targets’ domicile. The results reported in Table 3 (Panel A) show that the average
acquirer earns statistically significant gains (1.36 %) on the announcement of a takeover
bid. Table 3 (Panels B and C) show similar findings when the 3- and 4-factor models are
used to estimate the acquirer gains. This is consistent with UK studies that include M&As
of both listed and unlisted targets (Draper and Paudyal 2006). The table further shows that
firms acquiring domestic targets earn no significantly different abnormal returns to firms
acquiring foreign targets (diff = 0.06 %), consistent with Lowinski et al. (2004). However,
further analysis (Panel A) shows that domestic target acquirers: (1) outperform acquirers of
foreign targets in the G6 group of countries by 0.42 %; and (2) outperform acquirers of
foreign targets in the RoW group of countries by 0.63 %. In Table 3 (Panels B and C) we
estimate the CARs based on the 3-factor Fama–French (1993) and 4-factor Carhart
(1997) models, respectively, where we report similar findings. Moreover, among the
CBAs, acquirers enjoy 1.05 % higher abnormal returns when targets are based in the RoW
rather than in the G6 group of countries (Panel A). Whether these gains to acquirers in the
framework of domestic deals versus CBAs are driven by the impact of EMVCs at home,
relative to those in the host countries, is empirically investigated in this paper and the
results are recorded in the following section.
Table 3 continued
Equity market valuations conditions
ALL Low-
EMVCs
Neutral-
EMVCs
High-
EMVCs
HML-
EMVCs
Domestic versus CBA (G6)
Mean -6.14 -0.10 -15.10** 4.95
Median -16.78*** -7.24 -25.16*** -9.39
Domestic versus CBA (RoW)
Mean -3.57 -8.60 -6.00 6.77
Median -17.87*** -25.93** -17.11** -11.11
G6 versus RoW
Mean 2.57 -8.50 9.10 1.83
Median -1.09 -18.69 8.05 -1.73
The table presents 5-day (t - 2, t ? 2) announcement period’s cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in
percent measured as in Eq. 2, as well as the 1- and 5-year post-merger buy-and-hold abnormal returns
(BHAR) in percent measured as in Eq. 3. Both the CARs and BHARs are reported by the domicile of targets
(domestic, CBA, and CBA sub-groups) and equity market valuations conditions (EMVCs). The financial
conditions are classified by the de-trended market P/E ratio of FTSE All-Share Market Index. EMVCs is
depicted as announcement periods of depressed (Low-EMVCs), neutral (Neutral-EMVCs), and booming
(High-EMVCs) markets). The table further reports acquirers’ CAR by the state of EMVCs (HML EMVCs
stands for High Minus Low EMVCs) and the differentials between acquirers’ gains from domestic and
foreign (CBA) deals. In Panel A the acquirers’ CAR is estimated based on the adjusted market model (as
shown in Eq. 1). In Panel B the acquirers’ CAR is estimated based on the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model. In
Panel C the acquirers’ CAR is estimated based on the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model. In Panel D
and E the acquirers’ BHAR for 1- and 5-years, respectively. The process of de-trending is discussed in
Sect. 3.3. All variables are defined in the Appendix 1. The significance of the difference the means of two
groups of acquirers is tested by using the t test of equality of means. The significance of the median is tested
by using the ‘Sign’ test. The significance of the difference between the medians of two groups of acquirers is
tested by using the Wilcoxon two-sample test. The number of deals (N) for each group is reported below the
estimates of excess returns
***, **, * Significance level at 1, 5, and 10 %, respectively
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4.2 EMVCs and acquirers’ short- and long-run gains
Analysis of the acquirers’ gains by the EMVCs at the time of the M&A announcement
reveal that the gains increase monotonically with EMVCs (Table 3, Panels A, B and C).
The average gains to all acquirers increase from 1.04 % for M&As announced during low-
EMVC periods to 1.99 % during high-EMVC periods (Panel A), or from 1.09 % for
M&As announced during low-EMVC periods to 2.34 % during high-EMVC periods (Panel
B). These findings are consistent with Bouwman et al. (2009) who show that acquirers
enjoy higher short-term gains from announcing bids in high- rather low-EMVC periods.
This pattern holds for the analysis based on the de-trended industry P/E ratio, confirming
that the results are robust to the methods of assessment of market conditions. This evidence
is not sensitive to the choice of the method of payment and confirms the prediction that
acquirers should gain more from bids announced at the time of high-EMVCs due to
favorable investors’ sentiment (optimism). Overall, the results support part of the first
hypothesis (H1a) and provide additional evidence in support of the neoclassical theory of
mergers.
Further analysis shows that EMVCs play a significant role in explaining the difference
in acquirers’ gains by their targets’ domicile (differentials recorded in Panels A, B and C).
In particular, acquirers experience similar abnormal from domestic versus foreign
M&As (as a whole) regardless the level of EMVC in the UK at the time of M&A
announcements. However, we find that the groupings of the countries of foreign targets
according to the degree of correlation of the EMVCs between home and host markets plays
a significant role. Specifically, acquirers’ shareholders earn 1.48 % higher abnormal
returns when they acquire targets in the domestic rather than G6 group of countries (Panel
B) or 0.97 % higher abnormal returns (Panel C), when the deal is made during periods of
high-EMVCs. As the EMVCs between the home and host (G6) countries are highly cor-
related (see Appendix 2), the impact of EMVCs between the merging firms markets
remains trivial. However, M&As of foreign targets in the RoW countries: (a) earn similar
abnormal returns to domestic target acquirers, and (b) enjoy significantly higher abnormal
returns to acquirers in the G6 countries—especially during high-EMVC periods.11 We
argue that the EMVCs at home relative to those in host countries allow acquirers’ man-
agers to time the market and acquire targets at a discount, particularly in markets in which
their stocks are likely to be more overvalued than their targets. Therefore, a possible reason
for these findings is that the EMVCs in the RoW (G6) are lower (similar) to the home ones
and hence British acquirers are able (unable) to acquire targets at a discount. Accordingly,
this suggests that the null difference between domestic and foreign targets is balanced out
by CBAs in the RoW countries, as CBAs in the G6 group are experiencing losses. These
findings support the second and third hypotheses (H2 and H3) relating to the level of
EMVCs at home, relative to those in host countries, and the gains from domestic versus
CBAs. Overall, the findings reported in Table 3 (Panels A–C) show that EMVCs interact
with the domicile of targets in shaping the gains to acquirers.
Consistent with our first hypotheses (H1a and H1b) and previous studies (Bouwman
et al. 2009), our results show that M&As announced during periods of high-EMVCs, while
they yield significant gains in the short-run, in the long-run they either break-even or
experience significant losses (1-year and 5-years post-merger BHARs, Panels D and E,
respectively). For example, while M&As of foreign targets in the RoW group of countries
made during periods of high-EMVCs in the UK yield 3.33 % abnormal returns in the short-
11 This pattern holds when the 9 industry P/E ratios are employed to assess the market valuation conditions.
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run (Panel A), the same deals experience significant losses (-7.25 % monthly BHARs)
during 1-year post-merger period (Panel D) or they break-even during the 5-years post-
merger period (Panel D). Similarly acquirers of domestic targets (all acquirers) that are
announced during period of high-EMVCs gain 2.01 % (1.99 %) significant gains in the
short-run, in the long-run they break-even. Therefore, while periods of high-EMVCs are
associated with high gains in the short-run due to investors’ high sentiment or (over)op-
timism regarding the high expected returns of their investments, in the long-run there is a
market correction and acquirers break-even or even suffer significant losses.
In summary, the results of the univariate analysis reported in Table 3 confirm that
acquirers’ short- and long-run gains are affected by the level of home-EMVCs at the time
of M&A announcements, as well as the domicile of the target firm. This suggests that in
making an M&A decision the managers of acquiring firms should consider the levels of
EMVCs in the home market.
4.3 Gains of acquirers: a cross-sectional analysis
We further explore in a multivariate framework the impact of EMVCs at home, relative to
EMVCs in host countries, along with several other known determinants that influence
merger success, on the short- and long-run acquirers’ abnormal returns. The results are
reported in Table 4.
As indicated by the intercept ‘b1’ of models 5 and 7 (models 1–4 and 6), the average
acquirer earns significant gains (breaks-even) in the short-run after controlling for the
impact of several merging firms- and deal-specific factors, as well as the impact of
EMVCs. Models 1–2 show that acquirers enjoy significant gains from deals announced
during high-EMVC, despite the domicile of the target firm. This finding supports our first
hypothesis (H1a). Model 3 further shows that M&As made during periods of high-EMVCs
at home and financed with stock are associated with the highest gains to acquirers’
shareholders. This provides great further support to our first hypothesis (H1a), the
empirical findings of Bouwman et al. (2009) and the theoretical findings of Shleifer and
Vishny (2003). Among the variables of interest, the strength of the domestic currency
(models 1–3) exerts a positive effect on acquirers’ gains, which supports our fourth
hypothesis (H4). The favorable effect of the strength of the domestic currency is not
limited to acquirers engaged in foreign targets, but it is also important for acquirers of
domestic targets. Higher gains from domestic target M&As are possible because the
strength of domestic currency reflects expected growth in the economy and investors are
willing to pay a higher price for stocks of growing/expanding firms. Hence, the markets
react favorably to announcements of (also) domestic M&As.
Model 2 shows that UK acquirers of foreign targets in the RoW countries enjoy sig-
nificant gains in the short-run, which partly supports our second hypothesis (H2). More-
over, models 4–6 show that UK foreign acquirers of targets in the RoW rather than G6
countries enjoy significant gains in the announcement period, which is more pronounced if
M&As are announced during high-EMVCs periods at home. This supports our third
hypothesis (H3), which predicts that M&As with targets in countries with EMVCs being
lower than those at home yield higher gains to acquirers’ shareholders. In contrast, foreign
target acquirers in G6 countries experience significant losses or break even in the
announcement period relative to domestic target acquirers. We argue that this is the out-
come of the high correlation of EMVCs between the UK and G6 countries (Appendix 2),
which ultimately diminishes the impact of EMVCs in such deals. Hence our findings on
domestic versus G6-only CBAs further confirm the findings reported by Moeller and
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Schlingemann (2005) whereas our results on domestic vs all CBAs confirm Barbopoulos
et al. (2012).12
The findings also show the importance of firm and deal- and merging firms-specific
features in determining the gains to acquirers’ shareholders in the domestic versus foreign
target acquisitions. Specifically, the relative size of the deal (across models 1–7), stock
payments (models 1, 2, 5 and 7), target listing status (i.e. unlisted, across models 1–7),
liquidly of the acquiring firm (models 1–3) have a significant and positive effect on
acquirers’ gains. The positive effect of the relative deal’s size is consistent with previous
studies, which conclude that the acquiring firm’s abnormal returns increase with the tar-
get’s size relative to the acquirer’s size (Asquith et al. 1983). The case of the evidence of
positive gains from stock deals is similar to the findings of Draper and Paudyal (2006). In
particular, provided that the UK market is overpopulated by unlisted target deals (Draper
and Paudyal 2006), stock financing of such deals leads to higher acquirers’ abnormal
returns in the short-run (Chang 1998). The estimates also suggest that foreign acquirers
with higher market-to-book-value gain more from acquisitions (models 4–7). Finally, our
estimates show (models 1–3) that while the market reaction to M&A announcements is
lower during the financial crisis, all else equal, acquirers engaged in CBAs or financing
M&As with stock, during the 2007 financial crisis, enjoy significant short-run abnormal
returns.
As indicated by the intercept ‘b1’ of models 9 and 10 (model 8) the average acquirer
experiences significant losses (breaks-even) in the long-run from M&As after controlling
for the impact of several merging firms- and deal-specific factors, as well as the impact of
EMVCs.13 Moreover, models 9 and 10 highlight that acquirers engaging in M&As during
periods of high-EMVCs do not enjoy abnormal returns within 3- and 5-years following the
M&A announcement. This is also evident when stock is involved in the M&A financing.
Our results are consistent with our hypothesis (H1b) and provide some support to the
empirical findings of Bouwman et al. (2009). Other results also indicate that diversified
acquirers and acquirers bidding for foreign targets from the RoW group of countries during
the crisis, experience losses in the post-merger period.
5 Conclusion
We examine whether the short- and long-run abnormal returns of the shareholders of UK
firms that engaged in domestic and foreign acquisitions is affected by the home EMVCs at
the time of M&A announcements, as well as the relative EMVCs between the merging
firms’ countries in CBAs. We find that acquirers enjoy significantly higher announcement
period gains from deals announced during high- rather than low-EMVC at home,
regardless of the domicile of the target firm. However, in the post-merger period, M&As
12 Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) show that US acquires enjoy higher gains from domestic deals rather
than foreign target ones. However, Meng and Sutton (2016) show that the listing status of the target drives
the cross-border effect in two opposite directions: acquirers of private targets fare worse in CBAs, while
acquirers of public targets experience significantly higher gains in acquisitions of foreign targets. Bar-
bopoulos et al. (2012) show that UK bidders’ gains from domestic vs. foreign target deals are not signifi-
cantly different. Similarly Lowinski et al. (2004) show that Swiss bidders’ gains from domestic vs. foreign
target deals are not significantly different.
13 Allen and Soongswang (2006) show that Thai takeovers result in significant negative abnormal returns in
the long-run. Similarly, Du et al. (2016) report negative long-term abnormal returns for Chinese bidders
targeting firms across Europe, North America, Australia and Asia.
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announced during periods of high-EMVC at home break-even or experience significant
losses. We further show that foreign target acquirers enjoy greater gains from deals made
during high-EMVCs at home only when the EMVCs between the merging firms’ countries
are less likely to be correlated, which falls in the category of the target being in the RoW
rather than in the G6 group of countries. Our findings also show that during high-EMVCs
at home, domestic deals yield higher gains than foreign deals in the G6 countries. Provided
that EMVCs in G6 countries are highly correlated to the ones at home (Appendix 2), UK
acquirers are less able to extract any gains from CBAs due to the high-EMVCs in the host
countries. Hence, in the absence of the impact of EMVCs, the gains of domestic deals
versus CBAs confirm those reported by Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) and Bar-
bopoulos et al. (2012).
However, we find that acquirers of domestic targets, and also foreign targets in the RoW
countries, realize similar announcement period gains regardless of the level of EMVCs at
home. Moreover, within CBAs, deals of targets in the RoW countries outperform those in
the G6 countries when announced during periods of high-EMVCs at home. However, this
is reversed in the post-announcement period. Provided that the correlation of EMVCs
between the UK and the RoW (G6) countries is low (high), UK acquirers are able (unable)
to extract significant gains from foreign deals in the RoW (G6) countries that made during
high-EMVCs at home, which is reflected in the short-run acquirers abnormal returns. This
is possible due to the low EMVCs in the RoW group of countries (as the correlation of
EMVCs between the UK and RoW is low). Hence, managers are able to time the market
and acquire targets in the RoW countries at a discount, particularly in markets in which
their stocks are likely to be more overvalued than their targets.
Overall, our results suggest that acquirers’ managers aiming to maximize their share-
holders’ wealth can extract signals from EMVCs of the home, relative to host countries,
and carefully pick the timing of their M&As announcements in both the domestic and
foreign market.
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Table 5 Variables definitions
Variable name Description Data source
All deals (ALL) Refers to the entire sample analyzed in this paper SDC
Acquirer age (AGE) Number of days between the day when the acquirer is
first recorded on DataStream and bid’s
announcement day
DataStream
Periods of high equity market
valuation conditions (high-
EMVCs)
Dummy = 1if the M&A deal is announced during
period of high equity market valuations conditions
(EMVCs) and = 0 otherwise. The financial
conditions are classified by the de-trended market
P/E ratio of FTSE All-Share Market Index. See the
text for the process of de-trending (Sect. 3.3)
DataStream
& SDC
Cash payment (CASH) Dummy = 1 when the deal is financed with 100 %
cash
SDC
Cross-border acquisitions (CBAs) Dummy = 1 with a UK acquirer and non-UK target
and = 0 with both acquirer and target are UK firms
(=Domestic [DOM])
SDC
Crisis Crisis = 1 1if the M&A deal is announced between 01
July 2007 and 30 September 2008 and = 0
otherwise.
SDC
Periods of low equity market
valuation conditions (low-
EMVCs)
Dummy = 1 if M&A deal is announced during
period of low equity market valuations conditions
(EMVCs) and = 0 otherwise. The financial
conditions are classified by the de-trended market
P/E ratio of FTSE All-Share Market Index. See the
text for the process of de-trending (Sect. 3.3)
DataStream
& SDC
Deal value (DV) Bid transaction value, in millions pounds SDC
Diversifying (DIV) Dummy = 1 when acquirer and target are based in
different 2-digit SIC industries and = 0 when both
share the same 2-digit industry (=Focused [FOC])
SDC
G6 Group of Countries (G6) G6 = 1 when a UK acquirer acquires a target that
based in the rest of G7 countries (=G7-UK) and = 0
when a UK acquirer acquires a target that based in
the rest of the work (RoW=World-G7)
SDC
Cash ratio (liquidity) Measured by the ratio of total cash and equivalent to
the total assets. Since these are annual ratios M&A
deals announced before (after) June are matched
with the ratio of the previous (same) year
DataStream
Mixed payments (MIXED) Dummy = 1 when the financing process of the deal
includes a mixture of cash, stock, and other methods
of payment
SDC
Market-to-book value (MTBV) Market-to-Book Value of acquirer equity at four
weeks and book value of equity from the most
recent accounting statement prior to bid
announcement
DataStream
Market value (MV) Acquirer’s market value of equity at four weeks prior
to bid announcement, in million pounds
DataStream
Periods of neutral equity market
valuation conditions (neutral-
EMVCs)
Dummy = 1 when the M&A deal is announced
during period of neutral equity market valuations
conditions (EMVCs) and = 0 otherwise. The
financial conditions are classified by the de-trended
market P/E ratio of FTSE All-Share Market Index.
See the text for the process of de-trending
(Sect. 3.3)
DataStream
& SDC
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Appendix 2
See Table 6.
Table 5 continued
Variable name Description Data source
Acquirer premium (premium) Takeover premium from Thomson Financial SDC
computed as the difference between the offer price
and the target’s stock price four weeks before the
acquisition announcement divided by the latter;
values beyond the range of [0, 2] are winsorized
following Officer (2003)
SDC
Private (PRV) Dummy = 1 if target is private and = 0 otherwise SDC
Public (PUB) Dummy = 1 if target is public/listed and = 0
otherwise
SDC
RoW group of countries (RoW) RoW = 1 when a UK acquirer acquires a target that
based outside the G6 countries (=World-G7)
and = 0 when a UK acquirer acquires a target that
based in the rest of G7 countries (G6=G7-UK)
SDC
Relative size (RS) Ratio of DV to MV DataStream
& SDC
Strong effective exchange rate
(SEER)
Dummy = 1 when M&A deal is announced during
period of strong Effective Exchange Rate (EER), or
strong domestic currency, and = 0 otherwise
Bank of
England
Stock payments (STOCK) Dummy = 1 when the deal is financed with 100 %
stock exchange
SDC
Subsidiary (SUB) Dummy = 1 if target is subsidiary firm and = 0
otherwise
SDC
Unlisted (UNL) Dummy = 1 if target is unlisted i.e. private or
subsidiary, and = 0 otherwise
SDC
Rule of law (RL) Rule of law is an index measuring the quality and
level of law and order in a country obtained from
World Bank’s International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG)
World
Bank-
ICRG
Political stability (PS) Rule of law is an index measuring the quality and
level of political stability and tensions in a country
obtained from World Bank’s International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG)
World Bank
- ICRG
The table describes and defines the variables used in the paper, as well as it indicates the data source. SDC is
Thomson-Reuters SDC M&A database. With a dummy variable, a sample observation without the value of 1
has a value of 0
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